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NAMIBIA: The State of The Struggle
We do not believe in a system that sells people.
- Katatura Strikers
It must be borne in mind that the Namibian people are 
shedding blood to liberate each and every inch of Namibian 
soil, thus each and every inch of the Namibian land must 
and will belong to the Namibian people.
- President Sam Nujoma
A man who has inherited a tumbledown cottage has to live in 
even worse conditions while he is rebuilding it and making 
a decent home for himself.
- Mwalimu J. K. Nyerere
Blood and Iron: Theft and Struggle
Namibia’s struggle against the imposition, consolidation and continuation of 
colonial rule passed its 100th anniversary in 198M. Unlike most African 
territories that struggle has been virtually continuous - even if with lulls - 
and has even from the beginning tended to create unifying forces among 
different Namibian groups.
Although Reg Green has served as a consultant to SWAPO, to UNIN
and to SADCC the analysis and views presented here are his
personal responsibility and are not necessarily identical to 
those of SWAPO, UNIN or SADCC.
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Namibia is an unforgiving land. The ecology is unforgiving - drought, desert 
and absence of fish wait to pounce. German and South African greed and 
Namibian need have impaired that ecology. The modern economy is fragile - far 
too dependent on a handful of volatile world markets, and ones which (with the 
exception of diamonds) are performing badly. The history of Namibia is 
equally unforgiving. It has been written in European theft - of independence, 
of natural resources, of land, of labour power and also in blood and iron. 
Historically that meant African blood shed by European iron - for the past 
decade and a half the balance has been less unequal.
For over a decade the struggle has passed the point of no return in the sense 
that South Africa could no longer realistically foresee restoring stable 
control by military means nor by cobbling up a Quisling or bantustan 
substitute for a genuinely national government. For at least half a decade it 
has also been clear that RSA was losing money on its once profitable colony - 
perhaps 1056 of RSA’s total budget - and had no realistic hope of ever ending 
that drain while holding Namibia.
The state of the struggle is relatively easy to sketch. So is the nature and 
condition of the economy and South Africa's built-in infrastructure for 
destabilisation after independence. What is much harder to sketch - at least 
with any pretence at accuracy - is the course of the struggle over the next 
few years. Namibia has proved a graveyard for the reputations of prophets - 
pro RSA, pragmatic and Liberation Movement committed alike - and may well 
remain so.
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Namibia: Internal Political and Military Patterns
Militarily, Namibia is held - held down - by of the order of 120,000 South 
African, locally raised territorial, auxiliary, mercenary, irregular and para 
military police forces, about one to twelve Namibians resident in Namibia. 
That is - just - sufficient to keep the war at the level of systematic 
guerrilla conflict in the north and less frequent sabotage over a much wider 
zone plus staging raids into and occupations of Southern Angola and putting 
down really threatening civil disorder with an iron fist. It is quite 
insufficient to create enforced calm, to restore settler (or enterprise) 
confidence, to win through despair the loyalty of many Namibians - indeed to 
do much beyond buying time.
Politically, South Africa’s Administrator General - in fact a colonial viceroy
- rules. When convenient, he uses the South African created Transitional 
Government of National Unity as a screen and protective device. As it is not 
in fact a government, is in no sense national, tends to remarkable disunity 
within itself let alone with most Namibians - (doubtless it is transitional if 
that means impermanent!) - its uses even as protective colouration are 
limited.
The TGNU is the latest in a series of RSA attempts to cobble up a credible 
anti-SWAPO ’alternative'. It is also the most shopworn and least convincing 
of the lot. The 1970s Turnhalle circus with Chief Hosea Kutako and Dirk Mudge 
was far less implausible. But Kutako is dead (probably at the hands of a 
Turnhalle rival) and Mudge has been outflanked by a white settler fraction 
which is more or less the Namibian extension of the South African Conservative 
Party even if Mudge remains in charge of finance (subject to RSA provision and
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monitoring).
In a plausible election it would be very hard to suppose the TGNU's components 
could win even 20$ of the vote. Another 5$ might go to conservative local 
groups which have avoided the TGNU because they view its embrace as the kiss 
of political death.
A different set of small parties - e.g. the Christian Democrats (German plus 
one Northern Area), the Damara Chiefs Council, SWANU (an old nationalist party 
shrunk to a fraction of the Herero people) - might win 10 to 15/6 of the votes. 
These groups are in fact in relatively close domestic cooperation with SWAPO 
(and are so perceived by South Africa).
The dominant non-party groups are churches and trade unions. Namibia is a 
very Christian country, probably over 75$ of its people are at least 
semi-practising church members. The Namibian National Council of Churches 
(Lutheran, Catholic, Anglican, African Methodist Episcopal, Methodist, 
Presbyterian) is a very powerful force socially, morally and politically. It 
has been driven - by South African action and the churches1 reflection on what 
Christianity means in the context of Namibia - into an overtly liberationist 
political stance and a de facto endorsement of armed struggle (the NCC members 
do provide SWAPO chaplains - but not SADF or SWATF chaplains) and tacitly of 
perceiving SWAPO as the leading, legitimate political force and the only one 
capable of achieving liberation.
Trade unions - affiliated in practice to the National Association of Namibian 
Workers which, in turn, is linked to SWAPO - have re-emerged as significant 
forces over the past eighteen nonths. Labour struggle is not new in Namibia
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nor are labour organisations and strikes, but pre-1985 ones had been largely 
broken or had integrated into the more general SWAPO political process. The 
strongest union is the National Union of Miners - mine workers have 
historically been among SWAPO’s key and firm constituencies.
SWAPO (The South West African People’s Organisation) is the dominant political 
movement. It has shaped the form of dialogue and by armed struggle plus 
diplomacy put it on both the territorial and the international agenda. It has 
a political programme, skilled cadres, a shadow government with research 
capacity, substantial civil governmental work with perhaps 75,000 exiles, a 
large training programme and an army (PLAN). It - and nobody else - is 
perceived (even by the TGNU) as able to "declare peace”. It is linked to 
churches, trade unions and the more genuine (if local or fractional) domestic 
parties. Internally as well as externally it has a substantial, visible 
presence despite repression. SWAPO's leadership includes members who are from 
all regions of Namibia and major historic groups - it is not "tribal". Even 
South African academic and intelligence analysts see SWAPO as likely to win 
6056 to 75% of the vote in a fair election. With either plausible constituency 
seats or proportional representation subject to a 5% minimum, that would imply 
70% to 9056 of all seats in a constitutional or legislative assembly. That of 
course, goes far toward explaining South Africa’s reluctance to hold a 
supervised election - especially since 1980 demonstrated the pulling power of 
a liberation movement even in a quasi manipulated setting by the Rhodesia into 
Zimbabwe election results.
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Angola: Through the Looking Glass
South Africa went into Angola in 1975 for two reasons: to attempt to establish 
a government willing to be part of a South African regional co-prosperity zone 
and - probably even more - to secure the buffer zone Angola had been for 
Namibia in Portuguese hands. When that adventure failed, South Africa’s 
Angola policy for some years remained destabilising Southern Angola, raiding 
deeper occasionally to keep the government off balance and using UNITA as a 
pawn in buffering Namibia.
Post 1981 escalation has changed the situation. South Africa does not appear 
to have clear aims attainable from its investment in UNITA. Pretoria is too 
knowledgeable and cynical to suppose UNITA could dominate or even survive in a 
coalition government. On the other hand, it can hardly envisage enough 
support to UNITA to enable it (and UNITA uniformed South African forces) to 
capture Angola, install a client regime and destabilise to the north to create 
a new buffer. Nor are there any signs of what a more narrowly economically 
oriented regime might seek - an oil delivery contract for peace and Namibian 
independence tied to delivery of offshore gas to South Africa and no foreign 
troops South of the Kunene.
The Angolan tail now seems to be wagging the Namibian dog so far as South 
African policy is concerned. This is further embrangled by a desire to retain 
a hold on the USA administration by backing their ’linkage” initiative and at 
least appearing to be acting to counter a ’Red peril’. Further complications 
arise from the partly complementary but potentially competitive USA support 
for Jonas Savimbi and UNITA - tactically useful to strengthen UNITA in the 
north of Angola and financially helpful in sharing the supplies, logistics and
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technical personnel role but risking Savimbi (who in his day has been an 
exclusivist black nationalist, a capricorn style advocate of unity with 
settlers, a hard line Maoist, a pragmatic social democrat, a neo-liberal 
capitalist, a Marxist-Leninist and a battler against communism) seeking to 
play Caliban ("get a new master, be a new man") and drop South Africa in 
favour of Washington.
Namibia: Costs To Pretoria
Namibia is a costly amenity for Pretoria. The net cost of propping up the 
local regime and waging war in and on the border of Namibia now probably comes 
to well over $1,000 million a year ($250 per white South African). The cost 
in lives is significant - probably of the order of 250-500 white South 
Africans killed or crippled annually (including accidents while on duty), a 
figure comparable to 8,000 odd a year for the UK or 30,000 for the USA.
Further, the 120,000 military and para military personnel in Namibia are tied 
down on the periphery from the South African security perspective. Both 
logistics and the nature of the war in Namibia prevent their rapid relocation 
if security needs flare up in South Africa. Further the Kunene - Kavango - 
Caprivi frontier is a permeable and long one compared to that along the Orange 
River and the Orange River defence line (including its command air force base 
at Upington) is already built.
In the present context these costs are high but not unbearable. South Africa 
can afford to wait to see what turns up or to clarify attainable goals in 
Angola. This has the added virtue in Pretorian eyes that dropping Namibia
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could give the CP the electoral slogan "Who lost Namibia?” and black South 
Africans the rallying cry ”Our brothers beat them!”
But South Africa does not really view Namibia as part of the laager - only as 
a once profitable appendage and a buffer zone. If it becomes clear that there 
are no major gains to be had in Angola and that the costs of holding Namibia 
are rising, it is very likely that RSA would leave. It might - then use 
Resolution 435 and the UN process as a screen or it might "do an Aden” (where 
the British simply left tossing the keys to the government buldings from the 
last departing military helicopter to their successors). In either event 
clauses or agreements on paper will not be RSA's main interest - the N P’s 
leaders know very well how little such documents are worth, they are experts 
at gutting them. They will expect to impose their bottom line decisions by 
the threat and/or use of economic and military destabilisation against 
independent Namibia.
The Price of War To Angolans And Namibians
Indecisive the Namibian - Angolan war is. Small or low cost it is not. 
Angolan and SWAPO combatants probably number over 75,000, South Africa and 
proxy forces over 150,000.
War related deaths (from direct casualties, starvation, the impact of health 
service destruction and malnutrition on mortality especially of infants and 
young children) has been estimated in a study for UNICEF at nearly 500,000 
over 1980-86. Half the rural population of Angola has been displaced by war. 
The 1980-86 loss of national output achieved contrasted with that likely to
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have been attained in the absence of war is probably of the order of $15 
billion.
The toll for Namibians is harder to estimate because the counterfactual is 
problematic - quiet colonial rule? 1978 independence? However, thousands of 
Namibians have been killed, maimed, tortured and/or imprisoned - South 
Africa's total war approach is notoriously brutal. Because the majority of 
Namibians live in the northern war zone, the daily lives of most (including 
ability to produce; access to health, education, water; personal safety from 
'security' and 'law and order' personnel) are severely restricted and/or 
distorted.
SWAPO's Projected Programme
SWAPO has a set of strategic objectives. At one level these appear in its now 
somewhat old Programme of Action. At others they can be added up from 
individual statements or speeches and from actions - e.g. in particular 
training (where SWAPO's achievement of securing training through tertiary 
level for about 1,000 Namibians is several times as many as that provided by 
South Africa) and research. SWAPO has sought to secure background material 
and analyses of options on virtually every policy area. It has not publicly 
committed itself to many detailed policies - first, because contexts change; 
second, because in several cases it seeks wider consultations with Namibians 
during the pre-independence constitutional process; third, because to do so 
would in some cases give hostages to fortune or prior information on how to 
block or avoid SWAPO policies' intended results to South Africa, settlers 
and/or enterprises.
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One main theme running through SWAPO programmes is democratic participation: 
through elections, through trade unions, in small scale production ("land to 
the tiller"). A related strand is non-racism, non-tribalism and non-sexism 
(including a strong women’s organisation and draft family law reform drafts 
already to a substantial extent applied by SWAPO in Namibian settlements in 
Angola and Zambia.
A second is equity and access: universal access to basic services, especially 
health and education, land - extension - markets for small farmer/ranchers, 
reduction of inequality (especially but not only where now based on race).
A third theme is national self-reliance (not autarchy) including: vesting of 
land and natural resource rights (and thus allocation of use rights) in the 
state; building up Namibian middle and high level personnel to operate 
Namibia; reduction of certain key external dependences, e.g. in staple food; 
creation of a substantial public sector role in the economy both in terms of 
control and ownership to create the means to implement a national economic 
policy framework.
Fourth is a clear concern for effective regional and international 
participation with the FLS, SADCC, the Commonwealth, ACP-EEC, the Non Aligned 
Movement and the UN family of organisations the most frequently cited (and 
dealt with) institutions.
Fifth is a very substantial degree of caution and desire to explore options as 
to timing, sequence and form within a broadly socialist approach to political 
economic policy. The facts of large public utility sectors, South African
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enterprise involvement and the probable abandonment of both many ranches and 
some enterprises necessarily mean a very large initial state owned enterprise 
sector. Beyond that SWAPO intends to secure control over finance and external 
trade but does not rule out joint ventures, special marketing corporations 
selling private sector products (as with Zimbabwe’s Metal Marketing 
Corporation) or gradual phasing-in of public sector ownership. A similar 
concern for studying contexts and alternatives before acting is evident in 
respect to mining and to agriculture (including ’white’ ranches as it is in 
the series of talks with representatives of the German settler community 
clearly intended to achieve a meeting of minds on how this community could 
play a positive role in an independent community.
In these respects SWAPO’s approach resembles, e.g. ZANU’s more than, e.g. 
FRELIMO's at independence. However, in Namibia the remaining white community 
and enterprise position is likely to be weaker and the number of early 
departures and abandonment of assets higher than in Zimbabwe. This has two 
implications - transitional costs are likely to be higher but there will be 
less need to delay or to dilute basic policy goals to avoid premature 
departure of entrepreneurs and/or senior personpower, a point which may be 
especially relevant in respect to the transformation of the bulk of the large 
scale ranching sector.
Dependence: Permutation on a Theme
Namibia is dependent in several distinct ways: first as a small country with
inherently unbalanced resources; second as a country with a
peripheral/colonial structure of production and of middle and high level
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personnel; third as an occupied territory of South Africa.
Namibia possesses major deposits of uranium ore and of diamonds, substantial 
base metal and coal deposits and - probably - moderate natural gas fields. As 
90 per cent of uranium is used to produce electricity and Namibia has 
hydroelectric - and potential coal and gas sources the only use for uranium 
oxide is export. Similarly Namibia can produce up to 20 per cent of the 
world’s gem diamonds but has no domestic market. Even for copper, lead, zinc, 
tin and salt its domestic demand - even with a reasonably large manufacturing 
sector - could not equal production. While power and mining could use some 
coal and gas, their optimal development would also involve exports of coal and 
ammonia/urea (from gas).
Similarly Namibia has large areas moderately well suited to producing cattle 
and sheep (especially karakul sheep). Even with adequate diets the production 
of meat would remain grossly in excess of demand and the domestic demand for 
karakul is nil. The hides and wool should be - as they are not - inputs into 
leather products and textiles but again ouput would exceed domestic demand. 
If - or with proper conservation measures when - the fish stocks revive, 
fishing and fish processing will exhibit the same natural imbalance.
A small African economy can build up a not insignificant manufacturing sector
- vide Botswana. But it will have many gaps because of lack of domestic 
inputs and/or economies of scale. By the same token - again as in Botswana - 
a substantial proportion of output is likely to be exported.
However, Namibia today is almost a parody of an economy that produces what it
does not use and uses what it does not produce. Of physical goods produced
-11-
enterprise involvement and the probable abandonment of both many ranches and 
some enterprises necessarily mean a very large initial state owned enterprise 
sector. Beyond that SWAPO intends to secure control over finance and external 
trade but does not rule out joint ventures, special marketing corporations 
selling private sector products (as with Zimbabwe's Metal Marketing 
Corporation) or gradual phasing-in of public sector ownership. A similar 
concern for studying contexts and alternatives before acting is evident in 
respect to mining and to agriculture (including 'white' ranches as it is in 
the series of talks with representatives of the German settler community 
clearly intended to achieve a meeting of minds on how this community could 
play a positive role in an independent community.
In these respects SWAPO's approach resembles, e.g. ZANU's more than, e.g. 
FRELIMO's at independence. However, in Namibia the remaining white community 
and enterprise position is likely to be weaker and the number of early 
departures and abandonment of assets higher than in Zimbabwe. This has two 
implications - transitional costs are likely to be higher but there will be 
less need to delay or to dilute basic policy goals to avoid premature 
departure of entrepreneurs and/or senior personpower, a point which may be 
especially relevant in respect to the transformation of the bulk of the large 
scale ranching sector.
Dependence: Permutation on a Theme
Namibia is dependent in several distinct ways: first as a small country with
inherently unbalanced resources; second as a country with a
peripheral/colonial structure of production and of middle and high level
- 1 2 -
personnel; third as an occupied territory of South Africa.
Namibia possesses major deposits of uranium ore and of diamonds, substantial 
base metal and coal deposits and - probably - moderate natural gas fields. As 
90 per cent of uranium is used to produce electricity and Namibia has 
hydroelectric - and potential coal and gas sources the only use for uranium 
oxide is export. Similarly Namibia can produce up to 20 per cent of the 
world’s gem diamonds but has no domestic market. Even for copper, lead, zinc, 
tin and salt its domestic demand - even with a reasonably large manufacturing 
sector - could not equal production. While power and mining could use some 
coal and gas, their optimal development would also involve exports of coal and 
ammonia/urea (from gas).
Similarly Namibia has large areas moderately well suited to producing cattle 
and sheep (especially karakul sheep). Even with adequate diets the production 
of meat would remain grossly in excess of demand and the domestic demand for 
karakul is nil. The hides and wool should be - as they are not - inputs into 
leather products and textiles but again ouput would exceed domestic demand. 
If - or with proper conservation measures when - the fish stocks revive, 
fishing and fish processing will exhibit the same natural imbalance.
A small African economy can build up a not insignificant manufacturing sector
- vide Botswana. But it will have many gaps because of lack of domestic 
inputs and/or economies of scale. By the same token - again as in Botswana - 
a substantial proportion of output is likely to be exported.
However, Namibia today is almost a parody of an economy that produces what it
does not use and uses what it does not produce. Of physical goods produced
- 13-
about 90 per cent are exported and of those consumed about 90 per cent are 
imported. That is the result of an outlook similar to the description of 
British colonies ("plantations") given by James Mill as places in which it was 
convenient for the UK to carry on some activities not as territorial economies 
in their own right.
Reallocation of priorities, supporting resources and prices could result in 
Namibia bcoming self-sufficient in basic food and provide a basis for food 
processing for the domestic market. More construction material (e.g. cement), 
intermediate goods (e.g. glass), light engineering (e.g. equipment and 
machinery maintenance and repair) and basic consumer goods (e.g. clothing and 
perhaps textile production) are possible. Meat, fish, leather and wool 
manufacturing could be built up for the local as well as the export market as 
could - probably - coal mining and natural gas based ammonia/urea production.
Similarly institutional dependence on externally (South African) based bodies 
could be reduced. Nor is the situation in which 60 per cent of managerial, 
administrative, professional, para professional and skilled posts (70 per cent 
excluding nursing and teaching) are held by whites who are about 5 per cent 
of the population natural. Both are colonial patterns.
Third, Namibia is dependent on the Republic of South Africa in ways 
deliberately designed to maximise the benefits to the RSA economy from holding 
the territory. For example, most of its exteranl trade is by land and through 
or with South Africa although it has (in law and right despite South African 
claims to the contrary) a natural deep water port and South Africa is not in 
general a low cost supplier. What it sells to RSA is again determined by RSA 
convenience/profit not Namibian. The dominance of South Africans among the
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expatriate (as opposed to permanent settler) half of the white personnel is 
equally artificial.
Thus Namibia is an economy likely always to have a high ratio of external 
trade to output and use. It could reduce this especially in respect to food 
and selected manufactures and substitute interdependency in some sectors via 
regional links but full physical self-reliance is not a practicable goal - as 
opposed to the economic self-reliance of being able to pay its own way.
However, located on the sea and hundreds of miles from any major RSA area of 
economic activity, Namibia’s economic (trade, transport, institutions, 
personnel) dependence on South Africa is totally artificial. What was built 
up by colonial policy can be reversed by national - at a cost and over time - 
perhaps rather more rapidly in Namibia than in several other Southern African 
states. Or rather it can be if South Africa does not use force to prevent 
such restructuring away from concentrated, unilateral Namibian dependence on 
RSA.
Inequitable and Moribund: The Colonial Economy
The main national accounting data - population, economically active people, 
output, external trade, budget, income distribution - data are set out in the 
tables annexed to this paper. What follows is a very condensed summary of the 
story they tell about the colonial political economy’s trajectory and present 
state.
The colonial political economy of Namibia has always been a political economy
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of theft. Land, cattle, independence, mineral rights, freedom of residence 
and movement, the right of workers and peasants to organise for their own 
interests - all were taken away by force. The history of the Germans and the 
Boers in Namibia is one of blood and iron - black blood shed by white iron.
However, until the late 1940s Namibia was of no real economic significance - 
even to South Africa. The rapid growth of its mineral, ranching and fishing 
sectors took place in about a quarter century after 1950. In 1977 the economy 
reached a plateau in respect to total output and stayed on it to 1979 before 
falling steadily through 1983 and levelling off again over 1984-1986.
Over the boom period Namibia as a source of raw materials exploited with cheap 
black labour, a captive market for South Africa and an employment outlet for 
(white) South Africans was highly profitable. That is not the case since the 
early 1980s. Now South Africa probably loses on the order of $1,500 million 
(R 3,000 million) a year by fighting its ongoing war against the Liberation 
Movement.
Why the economic debacle? The reasons are multiple - the Liberation War is 
not the only one. Namibia is a mineral based economy. Since 1975 most 
minerals have faced severe price falls. Uranium oxides price fell later. 
Diamonds did not fall in price, but to sustain prices output was cut by over 
half. Very few SSA economies have fared well since 1979 and in one sense 
Namibia is a fairly typical African economy. Another sense in which it is 
typical is that it experienced - and is again experiencing - prolonged drought 
which over 1976-1984 cut constant price agricultural (largely ranching) output 
55 per cent. The collapse of fishing relates to the occupation regime albeit 
not to war, but to the war of overfishing it allowed.
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But the liberation war has contributed to crippling the economy and prevented 
recovery. It has totally destroyed enterprise optimism and nearly totally 
wiped out settler confidence in the future. Gross Constant price investment 
has fallen by over a third since 1977 and net investment may well be negative 
overall and certainly is negative for the enterprise sector. Further the war 
has led directly to the departure of up to 40 per cent of the white ranching 
community. Finally fighting the war and trying to buy a Namibian support base 
has wrecked the fiscal position of Namibia and made it a millstone around the 
South African Treasury's neck.
As noted earlier, Namibia has a very unbalanced economy. Mining accounts for 
24 per cent, ranching and fishing (including processing for about 15 per 
cent), other manufacturing, electricity and water and construction for 3 to 4 
per cent each and services for 51 per cent. 1983 exports were 32 per cent 
uranium oxide, 25 per cent diamonds (reversed by 1986), 21 per cent other 
metals sand minerals, 8 per cent ranching products and 9 per cent fish 
products. Final goods imports plus fuel were over 85 per cent of total 
imports and intermediate inputs into production under 15 per cent.
While even in 1985 Namibia had a per capita output of R1,600 (about $800) 
about two thirds of all Namibians lived in absolute poverty. Part of the 
reason is that total recorded and estimated profits and salary remittances out 
of Namibia even in a depression have regularly exceeded 20 per cent of gross 
domestic product. However, the dominant reason is radical inequality of 
income distribution. White household incomes amount to 58 per cent of total 
household incomes for about 10 per cent of households - averaging over R20,000 
in 1983. A small black elite (12J per cent of households) average about
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R6,000 and had 21 per cent of household income; the same as the poor worker 
and peasant households (77^ per cent of all households) who averaged only 
R1,000 or one sixth black elite and one twentieth of white incomes.
Over the period since 1977-1985 real production per capita - constant price 
output adjusted for worsening terms of trade, i.e. more Namibian exports 
needed to pay for any given volume of imports - has fallen about 375 to 40 per 
cent. Investment per capita has declined over 60 per cent, private 
consumption over 40 per cent but general government has risen over 60 per cent 
per capita.
This pattern has led to a fiscal debacle. Until 1980 Namibia’s budget was in 
fact sound with a surplus of recurrent revenue over recurrent expenditure 
standard (and sometimes total recurrent and capital spending was so covered). 
Higher black wages and salaries, ethnic 'administrations’, ’defence’ bills and 
the like ended that period. In the years before 1986/87 external borrowing 
rose to over R250 million a year. With some control over expenditure and a 
sharp recovery in diamond profits (which are heavily taxed) the 1986/87 budget 
may be close to balanced but includes about 20 per cent South African 
transfers (excluding customs and excise duties). Without these the fact that 
1983 - 1987 has only narrowed, not closed, the fiscal gap would be clearer.
Namibia's external balance - to the extent it can be reconstructed - regularly 
shows a viable trade surplus although in 1983 invisible (service) imports were 
enough above exports to make the overall trade balance appear negative. By 
1985 devaluation of the rand had boosted export earnings (in rand terms) and 
caused some contraction in import demand so that a clearly positive trade 
balance ensued. The dependence of trade on South Africa is very marked for
imports - about 76 per cent - but fairly limited - 18 to 20 per cent for 
exports.
Occupation Infrastructure for Economic Destabilisation
South Africa has of course destabilised Namibia's economy by occupation, 
exploitation, repression and war. However, the present point is that it has 
laid the foundations for destabilising independent Namibia. On the Southern 
African record there is every reason to assume it will seek to activate that 
infrastructure for destablisation to deter, hamper or block Namibian efforts 
to reduce dependence on South Africa. These building blocks for destructive 
engagement with an independent Namibia are in large part the result of 
policies designed to hold Namibia, but forward planning on how to manipulate 
an indpendent Namibia has also played a role. In any event what matters is 
what has been created.
First, South Africa has created for Namibia an 'external debt' which by the 
end of 1983 was of the order of R500 million, with interest and debt service 
of about R100-120 million a year and a rate of increase of perhaps R250-300 
million a year. By mid-1986 it may well have been approaching R1,000 million 
principal (100 per cent of export earnings) and R200-250 million annual 
overall debt service (20-25 per cent). In part this represents nominal 
transfers of railway, power selected mining assets from South African entities 
to the occupation regime along with parallel debt liabilities to South Africa 
for their 'purchase'. This creates a slightly more plausible 'external debt' 
bill as well as raising its level. To accept that debt would cripple the 
economy of an independent Namibia. To repudiate it - despite the 1971
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International Court of Justice opinion which clearly renders it legally void - 
might damage Namibia’s external financial standing and access to credit.
Second, it has created a budgetary shambles both in terms of actual revenue 
and expenditure, and, even more, in the appearance of total, permanent 
insolvency. The attempt to cast Namibia as a fiscal ’basket case' not worth 
assisting is quite clear in some of P. W. Botha's statements on the cost of 
the territory to South Africa. So is the warning that instant cut-offs of 
South African funding before a new tax and expenditure system was in place 
could cause a breakdown of governmental ability to act. Ironically RSA’s own 
financial needs have apparently halted this rake's progress and 1983-86 has 
been marked by less profligacy.
Third, in the multiple-tiered and racial administration, South Africa has 
created a bureaucratic monstrosity. It is not merely politically unacceptable 
as an entrenchment of racism; it is corrupt, wasteful and unable to operate 
competently for any purpose, as even the South Africans have admitted. While 
these functional weaknesses are a drawback to South Africa in occupation; at 
independence they will threaten the independent state with paralysis. South 
Africa can enhance this paralysis by the sudden withdrawal of key technical, 
professional and administrative staff.
Fourth, the efforts of large companies, and especially the occupation regime, 
to create a stable and skilled black labour force loyal to them will leave a 
potential time bomb. The professional and ski]led/semi-skilled workers are 
not politically loyal to South Africa. However, their pay scales of R5,GOO-
12, 500 a year pose serious problems. It is economically impossible to 
generalise these income levels to all workers. Even if it were, the effect on
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rural-urban income inequality and on siphoning off resources otherwise 
available for rural development would be politically dangerous and socially 
irresponsible. To limit these scales to certain posts would both entrench 
massive intra-African income inequality and make expansion of basic public 
services fiscally impossible. To sustain them for present African job-holders 
only, with new entrants on lower scales, would create great bitterness among 
returning liberation war veterans. To cut them - by direct scale changes or 
even by a freeze - would at best lead to loss of morale and resentment that 
gains 'won' from the South African occupiers were promptly eroded at 
independence.
The bantustan politicians, clerks and home guards pose a different set of 
problems. Their 'services', unlike those of the professional and skilled 
personnel, are not needed. But if they are fired they will provide the core 
for a political fifth column which could provide a focal point for discontent 
or the basis of a 'hired gun' insurgency, like the Mozambican bandidos armados 
(MNR).
Fifth, by remaining in illegal occupation of Walvis Bay - Namibia's only deep 
water port - after independence, South Africa could ensure that it has a choke 
point. Until Namibia creates alternative ports (for example, by reactivating 
Swakopmund) or gains access to others (via Angola or Zambia), South Africa at 
Walvis Bay controls its basic access to the outside world and can prevent 
diversification of trade and transport away from South Africa.
Sixth, similar consideration apply to road and rail transport. Rolling stock 
is highly mobile and, like many of the lorry fleets, is South African owned. 
Major repair facilities are in Upington in South Africa, or Walvis Bay, but
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not Windhoek. Roads and rail lines without lorries and rolling stock, and 
without maintenance and repair capacity, do not constitute a transport system.
Seventh, the sea bastion of South Africa’s Orange River line at Alexander’s 
Bay is within mortar or launch range of Namibia’s premier economic asset - the 
Oranjemund diamond complex. Furthermore, the ’boundary’ of the Walvis Bay 
’enclave’ is within range of the alternative port at Swakopmund. The 
implications are only too clear.
Guarding Against Destabilisation: Reducing Dependence
This infrastructure for destabilisation is alarmingly comprehensive and 
strong. However, it is not invulnerable. For each of its seven prongs there 
are at least partially ways of blunting them. Not incidentally these would 
also reduce dependence on South Africa.
First, most of the ’external debt’ is to the South African government or held 
by South African financial institutions. The latter portion is fully 
guaranteed by the South African government. Since the World Court decision 
any lender has been on notice that South Africa’s occupation is illegal and 
that it has no power to incur obligations on behalf of Namibia. Further, 
under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States, on independence a colony 
receives all of the colonial state’s assets in the colony and/or created for 
the colony’s use with no obligation to pay the former colonial state nor to 
meet any exteranl debts it may have incurred in the colony’s name. Therefore, 
Namibia will be in a strong legal and practical position to deny liability - 
as well as having a very strong moral case. If it acts along those lines it
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will not have the crushing debt burden and dependence on aid that weighs 
heavily on many African states today.
Second and third, financial and administrative reform, training and upgrading 
Namibian personnel and - where needed - securing replacement expatriates are 
Namibian priorities. Without administrative reform the state will not be able 
to act effectively to further its goals. Without fiscal reform - especially 
cutting wasteful or white centred expenditure and diverting part of the 
savings to universal access basic services - it will either go bankrupt or be 
unable to build up basic (e.g. health, education, water, extension) services 
to black Namibians. Building up Namibian capacities is a precondition for 
real Namibian control of state or economy while radically altering the 
numbers, sources and uses of expatriates is key to having cooperation with, 
not sabotage of Namibian aims. Planning in respect to administration, 
services and finance as well as actual training can to a substantial degree be 
done before independence. Whether desirable or not a leisurely reform, 
modification and phase out pattern such as typified most ex-British colonies 
after independence is not an option which exists.
Fourth, SWAPO can - indeed will need to - formulate an incomes policy setting 
out the case for lesser black/black as well as black/white inequality of 
incomes and the reasons Namibians cannot and should not expect (white) South 
African salary scales. Frank dialogue with skilled Namibians now in Namibia 
(and pre-independence training in self-discipline for those educated in exile) 
can achieve at least a suspension of disbelief and cooperation by many of the 
Namibians affected. In respect to 'homeguards', Southwest African military 
personnel and puppet politicians there can hardly be an economic solution nor 
an effective appeal to nationalist ideals - the problem is ultimately a
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security one. This situation will force Namibia to face the fact that high 
salaries mean high inequality, low wages and low peasant incomes - a fact many 
African states took over a decade to perceive while entrenched interests in 
inequality were built.
Fifth, Walvis Bay is Namibian. It was created for Namibia and for fifty years 
was administered as part of Namibia. Both the legal doctrine of estoppel and 
the Vienna Convention on Succession point to the strength of Namibia’s legal 
as well as moral position. In any event, interim port facilities could be set 
in operation within months and a new (or reborn) Swakopmund/Swakop estuary 
port built in two years. While not an immediate priority if Walvis Bay is 
secured, new deeper and shorter channel facilities will be needed by or soon 
after 1995 in any event. The rephasing would constrain other programmes but 
far less than would seeking to operate through a South African controlled 
Walvis Bay.
Sixth, vehicles, rollong stock and associated maintenance/repair units can be 
in place within months. That, however, is true only if possible needs are 
identified before independence and assistance sources programmed to respond at 
once to requests.
Seventh, action on the economic front cannot prevent cross border shelling or 
raids. That is a military and diplomatic task - albeit one which needs to be 
conducted with regard to what economic targets most need protecting. However, 
some econmic actions can helD. Leaving De Beers as manager marketing agent 
and perhaps part owner of Consoldiated Diamond Mines should deter South 
African attacks. Similarly Dutch or Nordic port construction and interim port 
management personnel would probably reduce the likelihood of South African
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attacks*
Thus, it is possible to contain and to erode South Africa's base for 
destabilising Namibia. In large part the measures needed to do so are ones 
which will reduce dependence on South Africa and increase the coherence and 
pace of development toward the goals set out in the SWAPO Programme.
Perspectives
Pliny is recorded as remarking (when his projections went wrong) that "out of 
Africa there is always something new." That has been the epitaph to many 
prognostications on Namibia. It has been especially so for short term 
political and military soothsaying as opposed to structural and trend 
analysis. However, a number of short to medium term probabilities can be 
projected.
First, South Africa is not going to be shot out of Namibia. The war will 
raise costs to South Africa and continue to cripple the Namibian economy but 
in and of itself not to a degree forcing the Pretorians out.
Second, neither can South Africa win the war militarily nor create a viable 
(or indeed plausible on inspection) white government with black faces or black 
bantustan style regime.
Third, therefore enterprise and settler confidence and investment cannot be 
restored - nor any presentable election won - by South Africa and its proxies 
in Namibia.
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Fourth, South Africa does not see Namibia as part of the heartland (or lost 
laager) but as a useful (decreasingly so), costly (increasingly so) periphery 
which is ultimately dispensible.
Fifth, South Africa’s Namibian policy is ironically subject to its investment 
in UNITA (originally to ’protect’ Namibia) and its inability to define 
attainable goals in Angola.
Sixth, if SWAPO or the international community raise the costs of staying in 
Namibia; the chances of any major deal or prize in Angola diminish and the 
ANC, Cosatu, the UDF, the comrades and their allies' struggle increases the 
need for security forces in South Africa then Pretoria will pull out. One or 
more of these conditions is likely to apply long before the end of the 
apartheid regime in RSA - Namibia is dispensable, power in the Republic proper 
is not.
Seventh, when South Africa pulls out of Namibia it may choose to use the UN 
process as a cover or to do a de facto cut and run. In either case it will 
count on its power to threaten and to act to destabilise and to attack - not 
on treaty or constitutional formulations - to protect its bottom line 
interests in Namibia (largely absence of foreign troops but perhaps also 
natural gas supply and one or more financial salvage jobs).
Eighth, in any fair (or reasonably fair) election SWAPO is likely to win two 
thirds to three quarters of the seats with the balance split (perhaps about 
equally) between SWAPO associated small parties and independents and those 
represented in the TGNU (or hovering like one northern party between the two).
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The two main institutions of Namibian civil society outside political parties
- the churches and trade unions would welcome (indeed a majority within each 
would work for) that outcome.
Ninth, the independence government will inherit an economy in disrepair, an 
inherently ill structured government and a society wracked by the heritage of 
war and the prospect of destabilisation. While SWAPO is well aware of the 
problems, has studied the options open to it, and has built up cadres of 
personnel, the speed of recovery is likely to depend to a substantial extent 
on the speed, level and appropriateness of external cooperation (including its 
pre-independence formulation and, in the case of training, delivery).
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Table 1
Population Distribution Estimates 1980-1983 
(people 000)
A. Geographic Distribution 1980 1983
District/Zone 
Katima Mulilo
Rural
38
Urban
7
Total(J)
45
Rural
40
Urban
8
Total (Jt) 
48
Rundu1 119 6 125 125 8 133
Oshakati1 595 18 613 615 28 643
Opuwo/Opuhoho 15 5 20 16 5 21
North 767 36 803 (61) 796 49 845 (60)
Tsumkwe1 1 1 2 1 1 2
Okakarara1 30 11 41 32 12 45
Khorixas1 17 12 29 18 13 31
Gibeon1 11 5 16 12 6 18
Rehoboth 18 14 32 19 15 34
Central/Southern
'Homelands* 77 43 120 (9) 83 47 130 (9)
Swakopmund 2 16 18 2 20 22
Walvis Bay 0 20 10 0 19 19
2
L u d e n t z 1 16 17 1 16 17
Coast 3 52 55 (4) 3 55 58 (4)
Tsumeb 10 15 25 12 13 25
Out jo 7 4 11 8 4 12
Groot Fontein 12 12 24 14 14 28
Otjiwarongo 8 12 20 8 13 21
Omaruru 3 4 7 3 4 7
Okahandja 8 8 15 8 9 17
Gobabis 20 7 27 21 7 28
Karibib 6 6 12 6 6 12
Windhoek 11 124 135 13 150 163
North/Central 'White' 
Ranching Districts 85 192 277 (21) 93 220 313 (22)
/ 2
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Table 1 (continued)
Mariental 14 10 24 15 11 26
Maltahoho 3 2 5 4 2 6
Keetmanshoop 7 13 20 7 15 22
Bethanie 2 1 3 2 1 3
Karasburg 5 6 11 6 6 12
South 'White* 
Ranching Districts 31 32 63 (5) 34 35 *69 (5)
In Namibia 973(74) 345(26)1318(100) 1009(72) 406(28)1415(100)
In Exile _ — 42.5 — 82.5
Total _ 1,360 - 1, 497.5
Notes: 1. Districts given name of main town not ’homeland ' designation.
2. Includes Oranjemund.
All estimates highly approximate. District estimates 
rounded to nearest 000.
B. Sex/Age Distribution
1980s - % of population 
South African
Census Adjusted
Women 51 51.5
0 - 6 10.5 11
7 - 1 7 14 15.5
18+ 26.5 25
Men 49 48.5
0 - 6 10.5 11
7 - 1 7 14 14.5
18+ 24.5 23
Total 100 100
0 - 6 21 22
7 - 1 7 28 30
18+ 51 48
Note: Estimated from National Atlas South West Africa
Sections 40 and 42-51; Rivers, B Namibia: An Energy Survey, 
UNDTCD, NAM/79/001, New York, 1985; Fragmentary reports on 
local employment, population situations. Subject to wide 
error margin but probably less so than ’official1 data.
Table 2
Labour Force 1977 - 1985
Economically Active1
1977 90 1983 90 1985 90
500,000 40 600,000 40 640,000 40
SWATF/Police2 7,500 1 15,000 1 20,000 1
2
Children and Students 565,000 45 675,000 45 720,000 • 45
•a
Aged and Handicapped^ 72,500 6 65,0005 4 62,0005 4
Non Econ. Active
4
Spouses 65,000 5 60,0005 4 57,5005 4
Exiles 42,500 __2 85,000 __6 100,000 _6
Total 1,252,500 100 1,500,000 100 1,600,000 100
Notes:
1. Includes unemployed, underemployed.
2. Under 15 plus full time students 15 and over.
3. Pensioners and other aged not economically active.
4. Not economically active means urban spouse not earning significant 
income outside household.
5. Fall in numbers relates to increased living cost limiting ability to 
survive on pensions and on male employee's pay, also fall in number of 
white households.
All estimates highly approximate.
Sources: UNIN (1978); W. Van Ginneken, "Incomes and Wages in Namibia", ILO, 
Geneva, 1985; Table 3 SWAPO, To be Born a Nation, ZED, New 
York/London, 1981.
Table 3
Economically Active Population 1977 - 1985
Category 1977 90 1983 90 1985 90
Core Employment1 187,500 38 176,000 295 170,500 26
2
Semi Formal Employment 10.500 2 18.500 3 21,000 3
Small Agriculture 240,000 48 300,000 50 311,000 • ... 49
Domestic Service 40,000 8 35,000 6 35,000 6
3
Informal/Unemployed 22,000 4 70,500 12 102,500 16
Total 500,000 100 600,000 100 640,000 100
Notes: All estimates, except core employment, highly approximate.
1. Formal sector wage/salary employment and formal sector
2. Black businesses with net income at least comparable to lower end of 
wage scale.
3* Informal ‘occupations’ yielding less than low wage and less than
substance plus overt unemployment.
4. Official 1984 estimate 75,000. 1984, 95,000 for unemployment.
5. Official 1984 employment total 157,051.
Sources: Windhoek Advertiser 27 August, 1981 and 24 January 1985, Manpower 
Survey 1984; SWA Directorate of Development Co-ordination, 
Windhoek, 1985.
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Table 4
Skill Levels in Namibian Formal Sector Employment 1985
Managerial/Administrative Professional
Sector Black White Total Black White Total
Agriculture N 4,000 4,000 N 1,000 1,000
Forestry - 25 25 - - -
Fisheries - 100 100 - - -
Mining N 500 500 N 1,250 1,250
Manufacturing N 400 400 N 400 400
Water - 100 100 N 100 100
Electricity - 50 50 N 50 50
Construction - 25 25 - 250 250
Transport/Communications N 750 750 N 700 700
Commerce/Accommodation/
Finance 100 1,000 1,100 N 250 250
Health N 100 100 2,100 800 2,900
Education N 100 100 7,150 2,650 9,800
General Government 500 1,500 2,000 100 2,900 3,000
Other 100 400 500 100 400 500
TOTAL 600 9,425 10,025 9,450 10,350 19,800
Skilled/Para Professional Semi Skilled/Clerical
Sector Black White Total Black White Total
Agriculture 250 500 750 17,500 N 17,750
Forestry 100 25 125 600 - 600
Fisheries N 200 200 600 N 600
Mining 2,000 1,750 3,750 6,000 N 6,000
Manufacturing 500 300 800 3,500 N 3,500
Water 100 100 200 650 N 650
Electricity 100 100 200 650 N 650
Construction 250 250 500 2,250 N 2,250
Transport/
Comunications 1,250 1,500 2,750 7,050 550 7,600
Commerce/Accom-
modation/Finance 1,500 2,150 3,650 7,400 600 8,000
Health 1,100 100 1,200 500 N 500
Education 100 N 100 100 N 3,100
General Government 1,400 1,600 3,000 4,000 1,000 5,000
Other 200 200 400 600 N 600
TOTAL 8,850 8,650 17,500 51,650 2,450 54,100
Continued......... /
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Table 4 continued
Unskilled Total
Sector Black Total Black White Total
Agriculture 20,000 20,000 39,000 4,500 43,500
Forestry 800 800 1,500 50 1,550
Fisheries 600 600 1,200 300 1,500
Mining 4,200 4,200 12,200 3,800 16,000
Manuf acturing 3,650 3,650 7,650 1,100 • 8,750
Water 750 750 1,500 300 1,800
Electricity 750 750 1,500 200 1,700
Construction 4,750 4,750 7,250 750 8,000
Transport/Communications
Commerce/Accom-
8,300 8,300 16,600 3,500 20,100
modation/Finance —i o o o 11,000 20,000 4,000 24,000
Health 1,300 1,300 5,000 1,000 6,000
Education 900 900 8,250 2,750 11,000
General Government 13,000 13,000 19,000 7,000 26,000
Other 500 500 1,500 1,000 2,500
TOTAL 69,000 19,000 139,000 30,500 169,500
Notes:
N Means negligible
Estimated from sectoral chapters UNIN, 1986; fragmentaray data; 
Manpower Survey 1984 Directorate of Development Coordination, SWA 
Administration, Windhoek 1985.
All estimates approximate and tentative.
Table 5 \ -- —  ■ ■
1 2
Education/Training Estimates Economically Active Population in Namibia
Black
1977
White Total Black
1983
White Total Black
1985
White Total
University or 
Equivalent ^ 35 5,000 5,000 75 5,000 5,075 125 5,750 5,875
Other Tertiary 35 5,000 5,000 100 5,000 5,100 250 5,750 6,000
Secondary or 
Equivalent 5,000 10,000 15,000 7,500 19,000 16,000 8,500 11,000 20,000
Other Post Primary 5,000 7,500 12,500 7,500 7,000 14,500 9,000 7,000 16,000
Complete Primary 42,000 7,500 51,500 52,500 5,000 57,000 60,000 6,500 66,500
Substantial
Primary 112,500 Neg 1 112,000 151,500 Neg 1 152,500 170,000 Neg 1 165,000
Negligible or Nil 300,000 Neg 1 300,000 350,000 Neg 1 350,00 362,000 Neg 1 360,000
TOTAL 465,000 35,000 501,000 569,000 30,000 600,000 610,000 30,000 640,000
Notes:
1. All estimates approximate, numbers rounded.
2. Not including Namibians in exile.
3. May be overestimate in formal degree terms. Relates to job levels and older holders may 
have more experience/on the job training and less degrees.
4. Significant post secondary education/training (including in-service/part-time) say 12 to 
19 months full time equivalent minimum.
5. Form 4 and Form 6.
6. Incomplete (less than 4 years) secondary or 12 to 18 months full time equivalent post 
primary other than standard secondary.
7. Four years or more - retained functional literacy. Functional literacy via adult 
education classified here.
8. Functionally illiterate.
Sources: Estimated from UNIN (1978), Chapter 14; Windhoek Advertiser, 17 January 1985; 
National Atlas, Section 72; Fragmentary data.
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Table 6
Economic Activity/Absolute Poverty 1977 - 1985 
(As 90 of Economically Active)
Category
1977 1983 1985
Total Absolutely Total Absolutely Total Absolutely
Poor Poor Poor
Core employed
Semi Formal 
■a
Employed”*
Small
4
Agriculture
t
Domestic Service' 
Informal/
Unemployed^
Total
38 5.7
2 0.4
48 40.8
8 6.4
__4 3.6
100 56.9
29
50
6
2.9
0.6
45.0
4.8
12 10.8
100 64.1
26
21
49
6
16
100
2.6
0.6
44.1
4.8
14.4
66.5
Notes;
1. See Table 2 for categories.
2. 15$ 1977 and 10$ thereafter assumed to be below absolute poverty line 
(real wages rose 1977-83).
3. 20$ assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
4. 85$ 1977 and 90$ thereafter assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
5. 80$ assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
6. 90$ assumed to be below absolute poverty line.
Sources;
UNIN (1986); Fragmentary Income Data from various sources; 1984 Field 
Research by C. Allison.
Table 7 -35-
1983 Gross Domestic Product
Sector RSA Estimate Coverage Adjustment- Revised Estimate %
Agriculture,
Forestry, Fishing,
Hunting 143 95 238 12
Mining 473 5 478 24
Primary 616 100 716 36
Manuf acturingJ 94 40 134 61
Construction 64 15 79 4
Electricity & Water 61 10 71 J it
Secondary 291 65 284 14
Transport and
Communications 97 23 120 6
Trade & Accom­
modation 235 42 277 14
Financial and
Business Services 125 10 135 7
Other Services 88 30 118 6
General Government 340 25 365 18
885 130 1015 51
Tertiary Sector
GDP (at factor cost) 1720 295 2015 100
Notes:
1. Coverage Adjustment Includes Household Self Provisioning (food, fuel, 
house construction), artisanal - semi-formal - small scale formal 
undercount, domestic service and Walvis Bay.
a. Household Self Provisioning (R 75m)
Crops R 15m Fuel R 15m
Stock R 30m Hunting, Gathering R 5m
Dairy R 15m Stock Losses (-15m)
Primary Sector R 65m
Housing - Estimated on basis 200,000 rural dwellings, 5 year 
average life; R 250 average labour content.
Secondary Sector R 10m
b. Undercount (R 30m)
Artisanal Manufacturing R 10m
Transport R 3 m
Rental/Housing/Rcoming and Trade R 17m
c. Domestic Service (R 20m)
35-40,000 at R 500-600
d. Walvis Bay (R 170m)
Fishing R 30m Transport-Communications R 20m
Salt R 5m Trade and Accommodation R 25m
Manufacturing R 30m Financial, Business Services R 10m
Construction R 5m Other Services R 10m
Electric/Water R 10m General Government R 25m
2. Includes smelting, refining.
3 . Includes meat packing, fish processing.
Sources: Adapted from Statistical and Economic Review 1984; methodology based 
on Green, R. H., et al Namibia: The Last Colony, 1981; fragmentary and/or 
sectoral data 'subsistence' (self provisioning), forestry, fishing and fish 
processing, port, domestic service.
Table 8
Domestic and National Product: 1946 - 1983 (R 000,000)
Year GDP GNP1 GNP as $ (
1946 22.2 20.4 92$
1950 61.0 46.4 76%
1954 107.2 74.4 70%
1956 141.6 85.1 60%
1958 121.3 83.2 69%
1962 146.7 104.1 71$
1969 368.9 278.0 75%
1977 1135.0 710.0 63%
1983 2000.0 1600-1680 80-84$
1985 2900.0 2250-2400 77-83$
Notes:
1. Methods of estimating factor payments and remittances vary. 1946-62 data 
are comparable with each other and probably roughly comparable with 1977 
and 1983. 1969 is apparently on a basis likely to increase the GNP/GDP 
ratio by a least 5$.
2. Excluding 1969 (see Note 1) the swings correspond to degree of economic 
and especially enterprise surplus) buoyancy. This improved steadily over 
1946- 1957, worsened sharply 1958-60, recovered 1960-1977 and worsened 
radically from 1978 (and especially 1980) onward.
Sources:
a. 1946-1962 Odendaal Report, Pretoria, 1964.
b. 1969 ’Desert Deadlock' Financial Mail, 2-III-73*
c. 1977 Table 14, Namibia: The Last Colony (Green, JKiljunen, Kiljunen), 
London, 1981.
d. 1983 GDP and BOP Tables revised from UNIN, 1986; 1985 GDP adjusted in 
same manner.
Table 9
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Income Distribution: 1977— 19831 (R 000,000)
Household Incomes 
Wages/Salaries 
Gross Operating Surpluses1 
Jan Use Production 
Large Enterprise Gross Operating 
Surpluses 
GDP at Factor Cost
Distribution of Household Incomes 
White
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use 2
Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
Black 'Elite ,3
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use
Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
Black Worker/Peasant 
Wages/Salaries 
Surpluses 
Own Use
Number of Households 
Average per Household (R)
1977
700
450
200
50
435
1135
500(71$)
320
175
5
45,000(13$)
11,100
47(7$)
30
15
2
22,500(6$)
12,100
153(22$)
100
10
43
2 8 2 , 5 0 0 ( 81$)
540
1983
1445
1127i
205
112&
555
2000
835(58$)
700
125
10
40,000(10$)
20,875
305(21$)
240
60
5
50,000(12£$) 
6,100
305(21$)
1874
20
97?
310,000(77^$) 
1,000
Total
Household Incomes 
Households
Average per Household (R)
700
350,000
2,000
1,445
400,000
3,600
Notes:
1. Includes depreciation (estimated at R130 million 1977 and R313 million 
1983).
2. Rough estimate. May overstate number of white households. In respect to 
black worker/peasant households, divided households are treated as 
separate units thus adjustment from 6 to 4 average household size.
3 . In 1977 basically workers in large mines plus limited number of 
professionals, small businessmen, government employees, large scale 
non-mining enterprise employees. Rapid growth relates to upgrading of 
government black salaries, proliferation Second Tier posts, enterprise 
attempts to be seen as "equal opportunity" employers.
Sources:
1977 adjusted from Table 15 in Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen; 1983 adjusted 
from 1984 Statistical/Economic Review and 1983/84 Budget to correspond to 
adjusted GDP. Wage/Salary level estimates based on incomplete micro data 
for some categories and posts.
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Namibian External Accounts 1977-83 (R 000,000)1
Table 10
1977 1983
Exports 800 1060
Goods 775 1005
Non Factor Services 25 55
Imports 650- 1170-
Goods 550 1000
Non Factor Services 100 170
Trade Balance Surplus/(Deficit) 150 (110)
2
Factor Payments/Remittances 340 -420 320-370,
Recorded Interest/Dividends0 140 120
Unrecorded Enterprise Remittances'3 75 -100 50-75
Wage-Salary-Small Business
Remittances 125 -150 150-175
Basic Current Account Balance (Deficit) (190 -270) (430-480)
o
Government/Railways Transfer Receipts 75 625
Capital Account Net Inflow/Outflow 
Government External Borrowing 
Enterprise Capital
Inflows^ 
Enterprise Debt
Repayment 
Territorial Enterprise
External Balance
Changes ^ 
Increase in RSA Currency ^ 
in circulation 
Change in Net External
Commercial Credit 
Outstanding
Capital Flight
Notes:
1. All estimates adjusted to include Walvis Bay. Goods, non-factor services 
imports, recorded interest/dividends, government/railways transfer 
receipts estimated with some degree of accuracy. Other items highly 
speculative.
130-210
150-200
(25)
10
(35-85)
150
5011
(50-75)
20-(10) (50-100) 
(10) (20-30)
25
Neg1
( 20- 30)
( 90 - 100 )
2. Narrowly defined.
continued ...... /
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3. Probably seriously incomplete.
4. Adjusted for probable R20 million underestimation in provision 1983 
official estimates.
5. Not readily separable from enterprise external balance changes.
6. If savings held with Namibian financial institution impossible to 
separate accurately from enterprise external balance changes.
7* Railways R20 million 1977, R70 million 1983. Both government and 
railways include capital account transfers as well as recurrent, 
government transfers include R55 and R275 million for 1977 and 1983 
respectively (adjusted to include all of Namibia).
8. Includes parastatals other than railways. Includes loan and equity 
capital inflows.
9. Dominated by Rossing/Ctjihase mine development.
10. Probably largely mineral exploration.
11. Largely external loan payments by Rossing in 1983-
12. See Notes 5 and 6. Includes head office account balances of branches.
( ) means increase in net external claims.
13. Because RSA - not Namibian - currency is used in Namibia, increased 
currency circulation de facto represents a capital outflow (purchase of 
external asset).
14. ( ) means reduction in external commercial credit used.
15. ( ) means outflow. Highly speculative and if via shifting financial 
institution accounts almost impossible to disentangle from enterprise 
external balance changes.
Sources;
Statistical/Economic Review 1982, 1983; Green, Kiljunen, Kiljunen, 
Namibia: The Last Colony, Tables 14, 17, 20; various micro estimates. In 
both years exports adjusted to include new data on probable tourism 
receipts (see Chapter Wildlife and Tourism UNIN, 1986) and to take toll 
smelting receipts into account.
Table 10 (continued notes, etc.)
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Table 11
A. Exports; 1977-1983 (R 000,000)1
1977 1983
Meat Products 15 30
Live Cattle 50 35
Karakul, Wool, Mutton 70 20
Fish Products 65 95
Diamonds 300 250
Uranium Oxide 110 325
Base Metals, Other Metals and
2
Minerals, Concentrates 150 220
Other Visible E x p o r t s ^  20 30
Exports Non-Factor Services 25 55
Total 800 1060
Notes:
1. Adjusted to include all of Namibia.
2. Includes concentrates, ores, salt.
3 . Hides and skins may account for up to 25%-
4. Includes tourism, business travel, toll smelting, non-Namibian ores.
Sources: Statistical/Economic Review, 1984; Namibia:The Last Colony, Tables
18, 20; Quarterly Economic Review of Namibia, etc. (Economist Intelligence 
Unit), various issues 1983, 1984; Financial Mail and Rand Daily Mail, various 
issues.
B. Imports: 1977-1983 (R 000,000)1 
Grain1
2
Other Food
3
Passenger Cars
li
Other Consumer Goods 
Fuel5
Other Intermediate Goods^
7
Transport Equipment'
7
Other Capital Goods'
Total
1977 1983
5 25
15 30
15 30
127* (16*) 250 (335)
60 275
112£ (172*) 135 (410)
20 30
195 (215) 225 (255)
550 1000
continued....../
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Table 11 continued
C. Direction of Trade 1983/84
Imports (R 000,000)
RSA Other
Grain
Other Food
Automobiles
Other Consumer Goods
Fuel
Other Intermediate Goods 
Transport Equipment 
Other Capital Goods 
Total
25
25
20
200
275
75
15
125
760
769'
5
10
50
60
15
100
240
24$;
1. If fuel treated as 50$ other RSA share falls to 63$.
2. Dominantly Western Europe, North America, Japan, in that order, 
Note: Estimated from import patterns of Botswana, Swaziland.
Exports ($)
Western Europe 
USA1
South Africa 
Japan
Independent Africa 
Socialist Europe 
Other
Recorded Exports
33-35
22-28
18-20
14-16
1-2
4-6
Adjusted to Include 
Namibian EEZ Fish
32-34
20-26
18-20
12-14
1-2
5-6
4-5
Note: 1. Treats diamonds in terms of final destination - most via 
RSA, London and often Amsterdam.
Estimated from incomplete micro data on destination of exports.
« r* '
Table 12
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A. 1983/84 Consolidated Territorial Budget (R 000.000)1
Total Expenditure 1,300 Total Finance 1,300
r
Recurrent 1,050 Revenue 750
Capital 200 Gap 500
By Category By Category
Second Tier Indirect (360)
Central Budget 285 Custom Excise ' 275
Own Revenue
2
150 Sales Tax 85
Central Admin'stn. 40 Direct (215)
'Debt* Service 76 Mining Taxes 75
Other Financial Other Company tax 35
Transfers 79 Dividend Remittance Tax 10
Defence 713 Personal Income Tax 1457
Police 533 Other (175)
Agriculture 70 Service Charges and Rates 140
Transport 91 Fees, Licences, etc. 35
Water 56 Subtotal 750
Education 42 (122)n RSA Transfer 275
Health 32 (82)14 Borrowing 195
Walvis Bay 114 Residual 30
Other5 141 Total 1,300
Total 1,300
Notes:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6. 
7.
Adjusted to cover Walvis Bay plus Second Tier and Municipal expenditure 
from own revenue.
Dominantly white Second Tier and Windhoek.
Excludes expenditure on RSA Budget. Also excludes ’home guards* etc., on 
second tier budgets.
Including ’Second Tier’funding purportedly spent on these heads.
Includes municipal budget guesstimates.
Includes Walvis Bay, Second Tier, Municipal.
Collected by Second Tier. Indirect tax revenue is aggregated into RSA 
Revenue Estimates.
Sources: 1983/84 Budget Estimates adjusted on the basis of fragmentary data
on Second Tier, Municipal, Walvis Bay expenditure and revenue; Thomas, W. H., 
"Namibia 1985s A New Start", address 3-VI-85 at Klein Windhoek.
continued /  (2 )
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Table 12 continued (2)
£. 198M-851
Expenditure
Second Tier Central Budget 
2
Own Revenue
Central Administration
■3
Justice and Police-* 
Defence^
’Debt* Service 
Other Financial 
National Education (135) 
National Health (75)^ 
Water Affairs 
Agriculture
Posts, Telecommunications 
Transport
Economic and Manpower
Others
Total
Recurrent Expenditure 
Capital
6
Revenue 
Opening Surplus 
Indirect
Customs/Excise 
Sales Tax 
Direct
Mining Tax 
Other Company Tax 
Personal Income Tax 
Dividend Remittance Tax 
Other
Loans Raised 
RSA Transfer Basic 
RSA Transfer Defence 
Total
Expenditure
7
Revenue'
Gap
Estimated 
Budget Actual
305
200
58
66
131
149
98
56
14
56
46
59
97
96
149
1,580 1,520
1,340
240
56 68
400 410
(275)
(125)
320 340
(105)
(30)
(175)
(10)
150 157
180 220
318 318
54 54
1,473 1,542
1,580 1,520
875 912
705_________________ 608
continued...... /(3)
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Table 12 continued (3)
Notes:
1 - 6 .  See 12A.
7. Excludes Opening Surplus, RSA Transfers, Loans Raised.
Sources: See 12A and Dirk Mudget, Budget Speech, 5-VII-85.
<* t *  v
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